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I.
On 15 August 1947, nearly two hundred years of British colonial rule 
came to an end in the Indian sub-continent. The anti-colonial move-
ment reaped its political harvest, after decades of political mobilisation. 
Great Britain, weakened by the World War, lost its most precious 
colony. In place of the colonial Indian Empire, two new nation states—
India and Pakistan—emerged through a sanguinary partition. Indian 
independence, stood out as a beacon for the global process of 
decolonisation. Barely two decades later, almost everywhere nation 
states emerged from erstwhile colonial empires, which sought their 
legitimate place amongst the fronts and hierarchies generated by the 
world order of the Cold War. All of us are aware of the magnitude of 
this major moment of the twentieth Century. In hindsight, now after a 
gap of seven decades, it becomes clearer that many histories lie buried 
under this history—not merely in the sense of a plurality of perceptions 
and experiences, but also in terms of a multi-layeredness of the his-
torical process itself. Deeper layers and undercurrents of Indian deco-































One of the most urgent questions we face today concerns the roots 
of the global re-emergence of a political authoritarianism that was 
considered obsolete up till recently. It is the seemingly irresistible rise 
of political forces, which strive to hollow out, diminish or remove 
democratic fundamental rights in response to often self-created emer-
gencies. This certainly is neither a specifically Indian problem nor can 
it be reduced to the development deficit of the so-called 'less develop-
ed' regions of the world. Those who speak on Indian history in Euro-
America, are either expected to celebrate a pre-assumed 'oriental' 
otherness or scramble up the familiar rope-ladder of civilizational or 
development theories. This is something I do not wish to do. These 
nineteenth century ideas are no doubt convenient: they always find an 
audience grateful to have their preconceptions confirmed. Yet they do 
not help to solve the puzzle of the return of political authoritarianism. 
The call for 'strong men', for cultural conformity, for nationalist self-
censorship and subsequently for a political "renewal" that refuses to be 
bogged down by democratic "formalities" can be heard in one or the 
other form not only at the Bosporus and the Nile but also at the 
Danube and the Isar, on the Baltic’s shores and the Côte d’Azur as well 
as on the other side of the Atlantic. 
In India too, worrisome restrictions are imposed on freedom and 
rights by the present government that are seldom recognised by a 
German public primarily interested in export markets. Many of the 
current restrictions have a long history—in colonial as well as in post-
colonial India. They merely assume a greater intensity in the current 
situation marked by global economic and social instability. In this 
context I refer to the excessive use of Section 124a of the Indian Penal 
Code on 'revolt' and 'sedition' against students, intellectuals, journa-
lists, artists and NGO-activists branded as anti-nationals. According to 
official estimates it was used 47 times in 2014, during the current 
prime minister Modi’s first year in office. 
This law on sedition, which goes back to 1870, was a British creation 
directed against anti-colonial dissidents. The incitement of hatred, 
contempt and disaffection against the lawful government was an 
offence punishable by incarceration, cash fines and, under the colonial 
government, life-long deportation. In 1922 when confronted with a 
'sedition charge', Gandhi declared the sedition clause as 'the prince 
among the Sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to suppress the 
liberty of the citizen' . In independent India, this section was repeated-
ly applied despite extensive criticism in the Constituent Assembly as 






























124 A was legally restricted to cases involving violence or the 
incitement of violence in actual judicial practice post-colonial 
governments applied it extensively and often misused it politically. A 
few weeks ago, Ramya, the actress and former parliamentarian was 
sued by the courts for violating this sedition section and prominent 
members of the ruling party demanded she leave the country. Her 
crime was, that when the defence minister Parrikar described Pakistan 
as 'hell', she contradicted him by saying that people were the same in 
both the countries. Matters came to such a pass, that the highest court 
in India was compelled to clarify that criticism of the government did 
not amount to sedition! 
The case of section 126A leads us to the questions this lecture deals 
with: to what extent could India, with the attainment of Independence 
and one of the biggest moves towards democratisation in the twentieth 
century, step out of the authoritarian shadows of its past? Why was a 
state that had emerged through a process of democratic mobilisation 
and introduced universal suffrage in 1951 (increasing the electorate 
from 30 to 173 million men and women) unwilling or unable to do 
away altogether with laws that would infringe on hard won democratic 
rights? How could authoritarian potentials be regenerated and ingrain-
ed in a country where large sections of the people hold democratic 
rights in high regard? A change of our historical perspective is required 
to answer these questions. We need to approach the mid-twentieth 
century in new ways to better comprehend the resilience of autho-
ritarian tendencies within post-colonial India’s polity and society. 
II. 
Let us start our discussion with an obscure pseudo-historical text. It 
can be found in the private papers of Sir Edward Charles Benthall 
(1893-1961), a powerful banker and spokesman of British capital in 
India in the inter-war period. During the war years 1942-45, he was a 
member of the Executive Council of the Viceroy of India and after his 
return to Britain he became the Governor of the BBC. The seven-page 
typed text carries the title: "A history of India. 1942-1957. Chapter 
39". The author or authoress is not named; the arguments however, 
point towards Benthall’s environment or even himself. Further chapters 
are not traceable and were perhaps never written. This text can be 
dated, in all probability, to the period of accession to power by the 
Labour Party under Clement Atlee in July 1945 and the Indian elections 






























here with a historical text but with a narrative that assumes a histori-
cal form to function as a forecast by a British Conservative of the 
results of India’s first decade of independence—a prognosis formulated 
when the end of British rule appeared imminent already.  
The text conjures up a scenario where political fragmentation, econ-
omic decline and military weakness turn India, by 1957, into the 
theatre from which a Third World War is started, triggered by a Soviet 
invasion across the Khyber Pass. The descent to disaster is described 
in the following manner: in the first five years of independence, a 
conservative government led by the National Congress would find itself 
susceptible to the destabilising machinations of a dissatisfied Muslim 
minority causing communal disturbances. In addition, serious social 
upheaval would be fomented by the Communists and the Congress 
Socialists. The democratic form of government would fail accordingly. 
Hundreds of thousands would be killed for their allegiance to one or 
the other religion or for being part of the propertied classes. Without 
the 'British cement' separatist tendencies would inevitably prevail. The 
south of India, Bengal, and the north-west border provinces would 
again attach themselves as 'dominions' to the British Empire. The 
Indian Princes, who before 1947 controlled a third of the territory, 
would be able to consolidate their power and defend their states as 
'islands of stability'. Moreover, warlords would revive or create feudal 
states assuming power in the north and some of the western regions 
of India. The republican rump of India controlled by the National Con-
gress would be reduced to loosely associated territories in western and 
central India with Bombay as their oversized capital. 
Despite all this diversity and fragmentation, the text did insist on a 
fundamental pattern applicable to the whole subcontinent: whatever 
the Zeitgeist might pronounce, democracy was ordained to fail in 
India: 'when it came to the pinch Indians preferred the rule of a strong 
autocratic ruler […] to the charms of democratic institutions.' Only 
South India, enframed to the North by the despotic princely state of 
Hyderabad and to the South by a Ceylon firmly under British rule, 
would enjoy an enlightened democracy while only a strong British mili-
tary presence could secure stability in the dominion of Bengal. Such 
was the prognosis, in conservative government circles of the British 































Of course, history took a different route. The political fragmentation of 
the subcontinent predicted by the British Viceroy at the beginning of 
the 1947 as part of the widely touted Balkan Plan, failed to materialise. 
Instead, a result of the Partition, which in its brutality fully measured 
up to the global standards of twentieth-century barbarianism, was the 
emergence of the two nation states of India and Pakistan. Moreover, 
the numerous princely states were integrated into the new republics, 
only in a few cases with coercion. In Pakistan, democratic structures 
remained fragile, with the military time and again capturing power and 
centrifugal regional movements becoming so strong, that in 1971 its 
eastern part established itself as Bangladesh. In India, territorial 
integrity and the democratic constitution proved to be remarkably 
stable. At the level of the centre, the suspension of parliamentary-
democratic forms of governance has remained restricted so far to the 
period of 'National Emergency' proclaimed by Indira Gandhi between 
1975-77. However, emergency laws and military rule have been used 
repeatedly in contested border states like Jammu and Kashmir, in the 
North-East, when suppressing separatist movements or in cases of 
severe social unrest in particularly poor regions. In a moment we shall 
discuss further restrictions on democracy, which are, however, not 
exceptional to India.  
Even so, we should not undervalue the depth and meaning of the 
democratic process in independent India. The introduction of universal 
suffrage—not for the election of the members of the Constituent 
Assembly, but from the elections of 1951/52 onwards—is undoubtedly 
a fundamental achievement that expanded the possibilities for partici-
patory politics. This proposition holds even when we take into account 
that the agrarian ruling classes succeeded initially to reserve a large 
part of the new local power resources for themselves. For the intro-
duction of universal suffrage did not mark the end of the demo-
cratisation process but provided it with a continuous dynamism. Since 
the end of the 1970’s, new, often lower caste actors forced their way 
into the political arena and appropriated the tools of electoral politics. 
This undermined the power of the Congress party, which had remained 
largely unchallenged since 1947 and propped up by socially powerful 
and correspondingly conservative groups.  
This also led to the emergence of regional, often caste based new 
political parties and provided impulses for social reform. The social 
base of Indian democracy thus expanded and did not shrink as in other 






























revolution' in the 1970’s when a second phase set in of the democrat-
isation process that had started with Indian independence. This change 
was not brought about without resistance and counter mobilisation as 
evidenced by the parallel political rise of the now-ruling Hindu Right. If 
the process of democratisation that was initiated after Indian indepen-
dence proved substantial and robust for seven decades despite of its 
undeniable limitations, the danger of a severe reversal has clearly 
emerged in the past years. 
Hence Indian history evolved very differently from the dystopia 
predicted by Sir Benthall. Naturally, contemporaries, including self-
proclaimed political and intellectual 'elites', then as now, cannot cut 
through the thicket of their own reality as a rule. The self-legitimation 
of the colonial establishment was based on proclaiming itself as the 
indispensable 'cement' of an India incapable of democratic self-
governance. This analysis was proved wrong. However, the danger of 
an authoritarian and even fascist development can be gleaned in the 
late 1940’s in the letters and speeches of Indian politicians, too—
protagonists not only of the radical Left but also of the moderate, 
liberal spectrum. They include the Gandhian social reformer and 
several-times Congress President J. B. Kripalani, the socialist leader of 
the nationalist mobilisation of 1942, Jayprakash Narain and even the 
social-democratic Prime Minister Nehru. At the same time, a call was 
given not only from the extreme Right but also from the respectable 
conservative press for a 'stronger', more dirigiste state with regard to 
domestic and foreign affairs. When confronted by massive strikes in 
the public and private sectors, even corporatism of the Italian fascist 
variety was propagated at times as a remedy. An authoritarian govern-
ment in India was expected, feared or even desired by contempora-
ries: diverse historical actors, locked up in serious conflict and 
diverging fundamentally in their views, shared the perception of autho-
ritarianism as a historical possibility, which therefore informed their 
actions. 
The historian Sumit Sarkar has underlined the need for 'elements of 
defamiliarisation' to enable a critique of the implicit assumption that 
democratisation was without alternative as India's developmental 
path—as if it was a quasi natural trajectory. Instead, the question has 
to be raised as to why India took to the path of parliamentary demo-
cracy at all. Let us, therefore, not discard too quickly as counter-
factual fantasy the pseudo-history of a fragmented authoritarian India, 
which I have introduced to you. Benthall’s conservative prediction can 






























questions not only regarding the reasons for democracy in India but 
also demonstrates the need for a reconstruction of the potentials for 
authoritarianism—potentials which could not be realised in full and 
emerged, after the consolidation of the postcolonial polity, from hiber-
nation only temporarily or regionally. At the same time, these 
potentials are not historically exhausted as possibilities and alter-
natives: they continue to cast their shadow on the present and the 
future. 
In the remainder of this lecture I will refer briefly to some of these 
authoritarian potentials: the plural has been chosen deliberately and 
indicates my main hypothesis. I argue that we are not confronted with 
a uniform, homogenous or even a coherent authoritarian political 
current, but with diverse, heterogeneous potentials which under partic-
ular circumstances can either reinforce or sharply conflict with one 
another. The analysis of this heterogeneity of Indian (and I think not 
just the Indian) authoritarianism can help us to understand which 
sources feed the global tendency towards an erosion of democratic 
achievements. This analysis can also help us to understand the 
limitations of this antidemocratic tendency. From a historical perspec-
tive, the intersections as well as the contradictions of authoritarian 
potentials seldom emerged as clearly as in the years of the transfer of 
power from the colonial to the first post-colonial government in India, 
that is between the years 1946 and 1952. Therefore, we choose the 
early years of Indian democracy as our point of departure for a 
discussion that identifies altogether "three" heterogeneous potentials 
of authoritarianism—potentials that were usually in conflict, but occa-
sionally also in coalition with each other: first, a religio-nativist2 right-
wing extremism, secondly a 'law-and-order' conservatism and thirdly 
the technocratic dirigisme of social engineers and planners. 
IV. 
The first potential of authoritarianism we have to talk about is India’s 
extreme Right, whose organisations took shape in the mid-1920’s. The 
very timing of this development indicates already that this develop-
ment did not take place in isolation from the rise of European Fascism 
and lot more has to be said about this. However, I must quickly clarify 
that India’s own strained social structures as well as its colonial 
political context facilitated the rise of its own brand of right-wing 
extremism. The ideological base was formed by a particularly malicious 






























not only by "blood and soil" (origin and territory) but also by religious 
denomination. Religious reform movements, since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, confronted the challenges of colonial modernity 
with identity affirmation and had formed, thereby, an important refer-
ence point for the Indian Right. 
In Hinduism as well as in Indian Islam, these movements propagat-
ed modernisation through 'self-purification' and 'return' to a supposed-
ly lost authenticity. They strived for an inner homogeneity overcoming 
the differences of region, caste, and sect while at the same time 
making sharp demarcations between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and 
Christians who had shared the same religious landscape for centuries. 
This most modern carving out of identitarian 'blocks', as the historian 
P. K. Datta pertinently put it, impacted the shape of the simultaneous-
ly emerging Indian nationalism and was not exclusively appropriated 
by its extreme right wing. Vinayak Sarvarkar, the most influential 
ideologue of the extreme Hindu Right, accordingly considered Hindu 
nationality to be based on allegiance to a religion that had emerged 
from the Indian soil, thereby excluding Muslims and Christians and 
placing their loyalty to the nation under general suspicion. 
The enormous political blasting power of this ideological construct 
will become evident to you immediately: it has an unmistakable family 
resemblance to anti-semitism and contemporary 'identitarian' discours-
es on Islam in Europe. Thus, national identity now was to be created 
through exclusion within, i. e. by stigmatising other religious communi-
ties as 'alien bodies' and leaving them only with the option of complete 
assimilation. This form of cultural nationalism allowed to delegitimise 
social conflicts or reinterpret them ideologically as struggles for saving 
Indian national identity while simultaneously avoiding direct confron-
tation with the colonial state. In parallel to this, based on similar 
premises and opening similar strategic options, the "two nation theory" 
emerged from politicised Islam claiming that Indian Muslims consti-
tuted a nation of their own. 
On this background, the Indian Right discovered as early as in the 
1920’s the attractions of burgeoning European fascism, first of its 
Italian and subsequently of its German manifestation. The resonances 
between the Indian and the European Right were based on a shared 
organicist conception of the nation: the nation as a spiritually satu-
rated racial "body", that had to achieve inner homogeneity by clean-
sing itself from within in order to maintain its youthful vigour and 






























globally while permitting slight modification to back up the claim of 
cultural authenticity. The obligation of  individuals and social groups to 
submit to the State as the embodiment of the nation—this doctrine of 
corporatism, which Italian fascists had developed to attack liberalism 
and socialism at one go, found remarkable resonance in India, as is 
evidenced from a series of new studies: in a period of massive social 
movements, which questioned India’s established social hierarchies, 
the order promised by Fascism attracted a wide spectrum of socially 
conservative and politically right-wing movements. Moreover, Fascism 
appeared attractive to India’s extreme Right due to its warrior-like, 
militaristic demeanour and its celebration of organised violence and 
blood-letting as a pre-condition of national self-purification.  
The older notion, still widely prevalent in the West, that a culture of 
non-violence largely shaped the political mobilisation of the Indian 
"masses" in the period between the World Wars, is, as we know today, 
a half-truth at best. Violent precipitation of political and social conflict 
was possible any time and often a reality both in cities and in the 
countryside. Gandhi’s insistence on 'Ahimsa' or non-violence can also 
be seen as an answer to the enormous potential for violence, and also 
as a project for political and moral reorientation. This project, how-
ever, was never uncontested or all-encompassing. This is also reflected 
in the emergence of numerous paramilitary formations from the 1920s 
onwards. Obviously, this was not a uniquely fascist tendency but an 
expression of a worldwide trend towards a militarisation of politics, 
which also extended to India, Great Britain’s most important military 
treasure, after the end of the First World War. Here, the militarisation 
of politics was appropriated by all important political and social forces 
including the National Congress, the Muslim League, the Communists 
and the movements of so-called 'untouchables'. 
However, paramilitary forms could be combined most organically 
with the religio-nativist postulate of a militaristic self-purification of the 
nation. Therefore, the Balillas and other paramilitary structures of Itali-
an fascism exercised a particular attraction on India’s extreme Right. 
In the 1920s, Italy was elevated to the preferred destination of diverse 
study trips of the Indian right-wingers, a private audience with the 
Duce sometimes inclusive. In 1926, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak 
Sangh (RSS) was established as a paramilitary organisation and rose 
in the 1940s to become the most powerful organisation of the Hindu 
Right—a position it maintains until today. However, European fascism 






























was reflected in the establishment of the Khaksar movement in the 
1930s. 
The call given by Vinayak Savarkar for a 'militarization of Hindudom' 
did not pertain to mere political mobilisation and symbolic parades but 
was also directed towards a militaristic defence of Hindu-India against 
its putative external and internal enemies. B. S. Moonje, Savarkar’s 
fellow ideologue in 1937 obtained from the British a license to establish 
a military school, which still exists. Here Hindus were trained in 
military drill and the use of weapons for 'fitting our boys for the game 
of killing masses of men', as he remarked in a memorandum with 
explicit references to Italian and German role models. The colonial 
bureaucracy did not appear to be bothered by this, as the Central 
Intelligence Department saw the organisation as aiming to fight the 
Muslim minority but not British rule. During the Second World War the 
Indian National Congress decided to boycott the British war efforts and 
accept the imprisonment of large parts of its leadership—a decision not 
acceptable to most of their Indian political competitors at that time. 
This also applied to the extreme Right, which saw in the weakening of 
the National Congress an opportunity to strengthen its own organisa-
tional base. 
The Hindu nationalist RSS, the Muslim League with its demand for a 
separate state, the Khaksar propagating a national dictatorship as well 
as the Akali Dal, a Sikh political party, built up combat-ready private 
armies in these years, which played a devastating role during the 
Partition. In 1946 and 1947 when the tide of the politically organised 
pogroms among Hindus and Muslims rose from Bengal to spread 
towards the West, it came upon a highly militarised society in Punjab 
where about a third of all soldiers had been recruited when the British 
Indian army was rigorously expanded during the World War. Demobi-
lised, combat experienced but not always disarmed soldiers teamed up 
with the mentioned private armies to transform the earlier no doubt 
brutal, but more loosely coordinated pogroms into systematic mass 
killings and 'cleansing' of entire territories. Within a few weeks the 
casualty figures rose to hundreds of thousands. The leadership of the 
Indian National Congress under Prime Minister Nehru was shocked by 
the vast scope of violence, and he had to admit that parts of their own 
base sympathised with the Hindu nationalist RSS, especially in 































According to official calculations in this region alone, this extreme 
right-wing organisation could raise an armed force of 50,000 men. In 
the meanwhile, the first government of independent India was not only 
confronted with the massacres of the Partition but also had to deal 
with an exchange of population to the extent of 15 to 18 million human 
beings with its neighbour Pakistan. At the end of the war an economic 
crisis too had set in that caused serious social unrest. Along with 
regional agrarian uprisings, a strike movement unfolded in the whole 
country, the largest so far in Indian history. It extended to the public 
services, which had grown exponentially during the war, and the 
government was particularly concerned as it included the police and 
other armed forces. The conservatives in the Congress-led government 
searched in this situation for allies who would support them in their 
efforts to stabilise the social edifice. The second man in charge and 
Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, started negotiations with the RSS 
towards the end of 1947 while making efforts to keep it in check. 
Golwarkar, the leader of the RSS, conversely offered the support of his 
organisation as an auxiliary force in the fight against communism. 
The negotiations failed when a particularly rabid right-wing Hindu 
killed Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi on 30 January 1948. In the prev-
ious months Gandhi had thrown his charisma on the scales to stop the 
massacre and stabilise relations between India and Pakistan. His ap-
proach was seen by the extreme Hindu Right as a betrayal of the idea 
of akhand Bharat, of an undivided India. The assassination led to a 
temporary ban of the RSS, which was lifted, however, in July 1949 
when the negotiations were taken up again. The conservative wing of 
the National Congress even succeeded in pushing through a formal 
decision to allow dual memberships in the RSS and the National 
Congress—a decision that could not be upheld, however, in the face of 
the opposition exerted by the social-reformist and democratic current 
around Nehru. 
V. 
Here we encounter the second potential of Indian authoritarianism, 
namely the Law-and-order-conservatism, which was deeply anchored 
in the National Congress, but reached out much beyond that party and 
can thus, as a cross-party current, be characterised as the 'Party of 
Order'. This 'Party of Order' differed from the extreme Right in that it 
insisted on the State’s monopoly of coercion as well as on other issues, 






























not rule out in periods of social crisis, as in the late 1940s, tactical 
alliances with the extreme Right. We shall now turn our attention to 
this 'Party of Order'. 
Since the end of the First World War, India witnessed an enormous 
rise and diversification of political and social movements. Wide sections 
of society responded to the socio-political post-war crisis with massive 
and new forms of protests, which the colonial regime countered with 
emergency rule, armed force and narrowly restricted constitutional 
reforms. If the association of local dignitaries had been the most 
modern form of Indian political organisation at the end of the nine-
teenth century, the period between the World Wars saw the sprouting 
of a wide array of political parties and civil voluntary organisations, of 
trade unions and farmers’ organisations, of dalit movements and forms 
of organisation against the autocracy of Indian princes, of increasingly 
autonomous women’s groups and, as mentioned before, paramilitary 
organisations of varied political colours. 
The local isolation of the earlier movements was overcome in a 
national public space, condensed by the acceleration of communication 
and the increasing spread of print media. Besides, the street emerged 
as the major stage of a new political culture. Anti-colonial nationalism 
gained in attraction first among the urban population to spread out 
subsequently in rural areas. It was not only Gandhi who experimented 
with the new possibilities of nationalistic mobilisation; he was merely 
capable of using them with particular efficiency and also clearly recog-
nised the risks they entailed. The spirits released by the call for mass-
scale mobilisation would be controlled if at all with great difficulty. 
Peaceful forms of protest easily turned into uncontrollable violence 
under a colonial regime that possessed limited legitimacy among its 
subjects, tended to revert quickly to means of repression and was 
hardly able to enforce a monopoly of coercion beyond the commanding 
heights. 
In addition, the political hegemony of anti-colonial nationalism over 
Indian society was never complete or unanimous although none of the 
social movements could escape its attraction. As a historical figure, 
Gandhi cannot be reduced to a skilful politician, yet he was that too. 
The parameters he set out for political mass mobilisation can thus be 
understood, too, as an attempt to solve the problems of so-called 
'mass politics': non-violence as an imperative put moral constraints on 
the forms of resistance, which were enforced by a trained cadre of 






























limited the legitimate political field; the notion of a 'trusteeship' to be 
exercised by the propertied for the benefit of the poor defined the per-
missible route towards a reconciliation of interests; middle-class mobi-
lisation for voluntary social service (seva) was offered accordingly as 
an alternative to autonomous self-organisation from below, for 
instance by dalits; the charisma of the "Mahatma" enforced submission 
to these parameters, if necessary with the dramatic means of public 
fasting. For the development of the anti-colonial movement this con-
coction was remarkably successful: here authority did not require 
state-sponsored authoritarianism. 
However, as soon as the Indian National Congress transformed itself 
from a political movement into a ruling party, other mechanisms were 
required to check and control the dynamism of social movements. 
When from 1937 to 1939 the Indian National Congress took over gov-
ernment in eight to eleven provinces of British India, the 'Party of 
Order' moved to the centre stage of action for the first time. The 
Congress’s electoral victory had generated hope for social change 
among wide sections of the population and invigorated the social 
movements. While the membership of the National Congress rose 
tenfold to 4.5 million within two years, its conservative wing took over 
government in the Provinces. The social movements that had brought 
the National Congress to power, were now confronted with the imposi-
tion of curfews, police action, detentions, restrictions on the right to 
strike and, shortly before the revocation of the Congress governments 
in October 1939, with the implementation of the emergency ordinan-
ces the British colonial government had passed soon after the begin-
ning of the World War. According to the patronising judgement of the 
pro-imperial historian Reginald Copland in 1944, the Congress govern-
ments had established themselves as a force of stability: they 'have 
stood the test imposed on them in the field of law and order'.  
This 'period of probation' proved to be a test run for the Congress-
led governments of the late 1940’s: the Interim Government from 
September 1946 and, from August 1947 to 1952, the first government 
of independent India. This period was, as already mentioned, not ex-
clusively defined by the transfer of power, the partition of the country, 
the integration of the princely states and by the making of the consti-
tution. It was also a period of unemployment and inflation, of wide-
spread social unrest in the cities and in the countryside and simul-
taneously a period of great hopes: that independence would benefit 
the Indian people at large, herald social change and improve their 






























forces were at play. The socially and politically conservative section 
was represented by Vallabhbhai Patel, the powerful Deputy Prime Mini-
ster and Home Minister, who also controlled the party organisation. 
While earlier the conservative nationalists had supported along with 
Gandhi political decentralisation and the strengthening of supposedly 
organic village communities, now in the crisis period of the 1940s they 
swung in favour of greater political centralisation and a law-and-order 
authoritarianism. This policy had three major components. 
First of all, the conservatives aimed at a far-reaching centralisation 
of political and military force. Initially, they could not bank on the 
loyalty of the colonial state apparatus that had been expanded mass-
ively during the World War, particularly on the higher-up sections of 
the bureaucracy, the police and the military. Furthermore, the political 
sympathies of the princely courts were with their earlier British 
sponsors or with the extreme Right rather than with the National Con-
gress. Zamindars, the big landlords wielded economic as well as great 
political power in important regions and private armies, often 
controlled by the extreme Right, had grown menacingly. The conserva-
tive law-and-order faction within the National Congress was not 
prepared to tolerate the existence of such parallel powers, yet recog-
nised, at the same time, the common ground they shared with the 
bureaucracy and the princes, with zamindars and right-wing para-
militaries: all of these forces agreed on the rejection of any fundamen-
tal social transformation and redistribution of resources such as radical 
land reforms. 
The assertion of political authority by the organs of government thus 
went along with the establishment of an informal cross-party alliance, 
of a 'Party of Order', which included these former "parallel powers" and 
sought to block any transformation of existing social hierarchies. The 
bureaucracy soon submitted to the new masters, whose law-and-order 
discourse did not require much reorientation. The princes lost their 
hereditary political status but were generously compensated and often 
retained great political power in their erstwhile territories. Hence erst-
while princely states could be fortified often into strongholds of the 
extreme Right and of conservatism. Zamindars, too, got a good deal 
while hesitant efforts at land reforms hardly infringed on their local 
status. The earlier-mentioned negotiations between the conservative 
wing of the National Congress and the violently right-wing RSS must 






























At the same time, the National Congress transformed itself from an 
anti-colonial movement into a party closely entangled with the state 
apparatus and accordingly with very great powers to distribute resour-
ces. In the five years after the end of the Second World War, its mem-
bership rose from 4.5 to 17 million. Urban activists lost out to agrarian 
magnates in setting the tenor of Congress policy, which further 
strengthened the 'Party of Order'. It was now able to consolidate those 
forces that strove to restrict the process of democratisation by pre-
venting its spread to a rural society marked by extremely hierarchical 
and authoritarian structures—just think of the widespread practice of 
bonded labour and of the endemic violence against the lower castes. 
The second element of conservative authoritarianism consisted in its 
insistence on a political demobilisation of Indian society. The renewed 
upsurge of social movements in the late 1940s confronted them with 
the task of forcing back into the bottle the persistent spirit, the genie, 
which had served Indian nationalism so well. The conservative forces 
in the Indian National Congress perceived the wave of social unrest not 
just as a political firestorm outside their own organisation that was 
stoked by the politically vacillating and increasingly insurrectionist 
Communist Party. The movements had a politically varied character, 
while the National Congress itself was still to a large extent a party of 
movements and not just of order: in 1942, young Congress activists, 
often with a socialist orientation, had organised a massive uprising 
against the British with the Quit-India movement when the older 
nationalist leadership was incarcerated in British jails. To them, the 
attainment of Indian independence was inseparable from a compre-
hensive social reform programme to be carried forward by social 
mobilisation. 
By the early months of 1946, when a massive all-India strike move-
ment involved parts of the navy and the police, the retreating colonial 
power did consider itself capable of keeping the situation under control 
for much longer. The succeeding governments led by the National Con-
gress possessed a greater legitimacy, which was used to extend the 
Defence of India Rules and other repressive means created by the 
colonial regime to the post-war period to break regional peasant 
uprisings and widespread movements against continuous inflation. As 
early as in 1946, a new Industrial Disputes Act severely curtailed the 
right to strike and armed the state with more far-reaching arbitrary 
powers than was common in most parliamentary democracies. While 
the conservatives around Patel carried out negotiations with the RSS 






























ists within the National Congress until the latter decided, in 1948, to 
form their own party. A hysterical anti-communist campaign accompa-
nied by mass-imprisonment contributed to the breakdown of the post-
war strike movements. The Indian left, which relied on the power of 
social movements to usher social change, was marginalised. Represen-
tatives of social movements who put their whole trust in the institu-
tions of parliamentary democracy but were not prepared to submit to 
the dominance of the National Congress similarly ended up in the 
political wilderness. B. R. Ambedkar, the towering leader of the dalit 
movement, was the most prominent case. 
The third element of conservative authoritarianism has already been 
broached: it concerns its means and would have long-term implica-
tions. The British colonial regime had promulgated a corpus of laws, 
which infringed on the freedom of expression such as the already 
mentioned sedition paragraph of the penal code. In addition to this it 
had passed far-reaching emergency laws (namely the Defence of India 
Act of 1939) had incorporated mechanisms already in the Constitution 
of 1935, which permitted in cases of 'emergency' to curtail hard-won 
rights of political participation in the provinces. The fact that many of 
these colonial legal regulations found their way into post-colonial law 
including the Constitution, cannot be explained as a mere oversight on 
the part of highly pre-occupied founders of the nation or as the sheer 
unauthored resilience of judicial structures. The 'threshold or zone of 
uncertainty' between the rule of law and the state of emergency, which 
was diagnosed by Giorgio Agamben for western democracies since the 
First World War, was established in India from colonial material in the 
late 1940s. This was pushed through against public criticism in a 
conservative effort to enforce the political demobilisation of society. 
Thus, the first post-colonial law permitting preventive detention was 
passed in 1950 despite protests: it rendered an emergency law passed 
in the crisis year of 1918 compatible with the Constitution that was to 
be promulgated a few days later. The authoritarian legacy of colonia-
lism was, therefore, accepted with open eyes.  
VI. 
The technocratic dirigisme of 'social engineers' and planners is the 
third potential of Indian authoritarianism, about which we must 
speak—a potential, which, in political terms, if far more ambivalent 
and changeable than the two introduced previously. Technocratic 






























on many issues but concurred that after the end of colonial rule a 
political demobilisation of Indian society and the erection of a strong 
centralised state were imperative tasks. If we have characterised the 
other two potentials schematically as (1) religio-nativist right-wing 
extremism and (2) the 'Party of Order', we can here distinguish a 
'Party of Planning', which also extended across party lines. The incep-
tion of this third potential of authoritarianism is closely connected to 
the world economic crisis of the 1930s whose importance has been 
highlighted by Dietmar Rothermund for the Indian and non-European 
world. The socially destructive force of the 'free market' had become 
fully apparent and a new assessment of the state’s role in the regu-
lation of economy and society seemed inevitable. Yet the political and 
institutional forms in which this new assessment was to take place 
could be imagined in the most varied manner. Wolfgang Schivelbusch 
spoke of a 'distant relationship', when he compared economic dirigisme 
and social planning under Italian fascism, German 'national socialism' 
and the US 'New Deal' in the 1930s. A global perspective reveals both 
the vast extent of this network of relationships and the deep political 
divergences within. 
India’s Five-Year Plans of the 1950’s and 1960’s are even now inter-
preted particularly by the advocates of free trade and de-regularisation 
as an expression of dogmatic-socialist politics, for which Prime Minister 
Nehru is identified as the main culprit. From a historical perspective a 
different picture emerges, however. India’s intelligentsia, economic 
magnates and political elites took up the global debate on the redefini-
tion of the state’s role of the state without delay in the 1930s. Italian, 
German, U.S-American and Soviet approaches were compared in total 
disregard of the political differences between the respective regimes 
and with an exclusive focus on their viability in terms of 'social engi-
neering'. To plan the economic future of independent India, social 
reformist nationalists like Nehru and technocrats like the erstwhile 
diwan (chief minister) of the princely state of Mysore, Sir Visves-
varaya, contributed alongside India’s most powerful captains of 
industry J. R. D. Tata and J. D. Birla. Despite conservative reserva-
tions, the National Congress formed a National Planning Committee as 
early as in 1938. 
Six years later India’s leading industrialists presented a document to 
the public that became known as the 'Bombay Plan'. Equally important 
was the fast development of the bureaucratic apparatus and of public 
sector industries, which after the beginning of the World War was 






























instruments of centralised accountancy, taxation and distribution, 
which created crucial preconditions for the later economic dirigisme. 
Behind the planning impulse was a diffuse constellation of interests 
and projects: the transformation of the rural economy through cooper-
atives; the formation of a welfare state; the attainment of national 
independence from the imperial economy; state protection and 
subsidisation for Indian large-scale industry; the fast expansion of the 
production of war-important goods; stabilisation of the British empire—
the most contradictory and incompatible objectives all seemed to 
demand economic dirigisme, though each of them implied different 
priorities and approaches to planning.  
Many of these approaches resembled each other, however, in that 
they perceived planning as a bureaucratic and not as a democratic pro-
cess. A specialised administrative elite had to plan actively according 
to 'scientific criteria' while disposability or, in the military language of 
the time, 'national discipline', was expected from the population. 
During the crisis of the late 1940’s the 'Party of Planning' and the 
'Party of Order' were in full agreement that the demobilisation of social 
movements and a strong central state were the precondition for build-
ing an independent India. This policy consensus provided a common 
platform for both wings of the National Congress, the social reformist 
planners led by Nehru and the conservatives with their strongman 
Patel. In regard of economic policy, however, the conservatives (as 
well as the right-extremists) favoured free trade, less control on entre-
preneurial activities and a removal of the price controls of essential 
goods that had been introduced during the War. Between 1947 and 
1950, conservatism dominated government policies, which failed, 
however, to grapple with the realities of the post-war period: neither 
could the crisis of the Indian economy be overcome in this way nor 
could social stability be ensured. 
New developmental impulses became evident only in the 1950s 
after the social reformers around Nehru reined in the conservatives at 
least at the central level and began to implement an economic strategy 
aiming at import substitution. Whether the Five-Year Plans can be 
regarded as 'socialist' is rather questionable: the historian Pulapre 
Balakrishnan found an 'uncanny similarity' between the official policies 
of the Nehru period and the 1944 'Bombay Plan' of Indian big busi-
ness. Certain welfare impulses are, however, undeniable and became 
evident, for instance, in a ten-year increase in life expectancy between 






























The authoritarian potential of economic dirigisme and social engi-
neering emerged from the political conditions of its realisation in India: 
while democratic social reformers around Nehru could fortify their 
control over the central levels of the National Congress and the state in 
the 1950s, conservative forces remained in control of most States and 
at the local level, in alliance with the power cartels of rural society. The 
dominance at the centre concealed a weakness in regions and locali-
ties, which had been exacerbated by the exodus of the socialists from 
the National Congress. Programmes of social reform relied, therefore, 
as the political scientist Sudipto Kaviraj has shown, more on bureau-
cratic impetus than on social mobilisation. As Nehru’s backing in the 
party organisation declined and opposition against reform programmes 
stiffened at the level of the States, he was increasingly forced, as 
Kaviraj writes, 'into the logic of bureaucratisation where people did not 
appear as subjects but as mere objects in the process of development'. 
These authoritarian potentials were perceivable already in the Nehru 
era—the famous large-scale hydroelectric projects are a case in point. 
Under Indira Gandhi’s emergency regime of 1975-77, draconic meas-
ures like the forced relocation of slum-dwellers for the 'beautification' 
of Delhi or the coercive sterilisation of the urban poor demonstrated 
the dangers of an authoritarianism of social engineering to a wider 
public. 
VII. 
At the beginning of this lecture we set out to identify three hetero-
geneous, often competing but sometimes allying potential sources of 
authoritarianism in India. The religio-nativist Right, law-and-order con-
servatism and the technocratic dirigisme of "social engineers" and 
planners differed from each other fundamentally in several aspects. In 
the early years of Indian parliamentary democracy all of them under-
went crucial transformations. They were thus not simply vestiges of an 
authoritarian colonial past or mere imports of splendid "achievements" 
of European civilisation. In their renewed form they were the para-
doxical product of the very process of democratisation that decoloni-
sation had made possible. However, authoritarianism did not become 
the defining feature of the post-colonial state, where an uneven yet 
developable parliamentary democracy could strike deep roots. The full 
potential of the extreme Right could be successfully isolated from the 
late 1940s until the middle of the 1970’s. It regained some political 
respectability only with the descent of the National Congress into 






























complete demobilisation of the social movements who had been 
instrumental in securing India’s independence could not be achieved 
by the 'Party of Order' and the 'Party of Planning', despite their con-
joined efforts. 
At the same time, all three potentials of authoritarianism have cast 
long shadows on contemporary India. The pogroms the religio-nativist 
extreme Right has been celebrating as national purification rituals are, 
unfortunately, not only part of the political repertoire of this form of 
authoritarianism. From the massacres of 1947 a bloody line can be 
drawn to the pogroms carried out by Congress activists in 1984 
against Sikhs to the anti-Muslim pogrom of 2002 in Gujarat where the 
Hindu Right led by the current Prime Minister had more than a hand in 
the matter. A shadow is also cast by legal instruments, preserved and 
adapted to post-colonial conditions by a conservative law and order 
authoritarianism, which have created a grey zone between the rule of 
law and the state of emergency. Even though economic planning has 
been discredited, the dirigisme of social engineering survives in other 
forms: it throws its shadow on the present when Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) are established, when industries are relocated or when 
programmes of urban beautification are implemented. As long as these 
shadows remain apart, democratic counterforces can measure up to 
them. When they merge and reinforce each other, especially when 
coalitions of right extremism and conservative authoritarianism are 
formed, the danger is considerable. The recent past has seen the 
emergence of such a coalition, but also tensions that may undermine 
its sustainability.  
In the last one hour you have perhaps heard more about the history 
of Indian authoritarianism than you wanted to. I request you to direct 
your complaints to the presidium of the German Historical Association, 
which decided to have India as a partner country at its 2016 Congress. 
Yet if you left this room with the reassuring feeling that the shadows of 
Indian authoritarianism luckily do not reach Europe, then I had done 
something wrong indeed. For the aim of my lecture was to create 
concern, even disturbance: I wanted to show that India’s history while 
taking its own course between democratisation and authoritarianism 
has remained entangled globally. This holds true till now. Therefore, at 
the end of this lecture I return to Giorgio Agamben and his studies on 
the increasingly uncertain zone between the rule of law and the state 
of emergency. 'At the very moment,' he wrote, 'when it would like to 
give lessons in democracy to different traditions and cultures, the 






























canon'. Europe and particularly this country, as we know, have their 
own authoritarian shadows. We cannot allow them to reinforce each 
other. 
                                                          
 
Endnotes 
1 I am thankful to Nicole Mayer Ahuja, Franziska Roy, Aditya Sarkar and Jana Tschurenev for their 
very helpful suggestions and to Naima Tiné for providing me the necessary literature. Without 
this help given to me at lightning speed I would have not been able to write this lecture at very 
short notice. I also thank Jyoti Sabharwal for taking up the laborious task of preparing an English 
translation. 
2 The German original of the lecture uses the term 'religiös-völkisch'. 'Völkisch' refers, in the 
German context, to an ideological current closely but not exclusively connected to twentieth-
century 'national socialism'—a nativist movement rooted in nineteenth-century romanticism that 
propagated the resurrection of a presumably suppressed 'folkish' identity in a struggle of 
purification against presumably alien elements. The proximity of this variety of nativist ideology 
to Hindutva has been pointed out in recent historiography. 
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